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Abstract
In April 2004, the United Kingdom introduced a new General Medical Services 
(GMS) contract that provided new governance and incentive arrangements for general 
practice. In particular, the new Quality and Outcomes Framework is a points-based 
system that sets targets for clinical, organizational and practice-related standards 
with financial payments for achieving set levels of performance. This paper describes 
the new contract arrangements and their impact on general practice – focusing on 
the experience in England, where wider policy changes are also having an important 
impact on practices – and drawing out potential lessons that will be of interest to 
Canadian practitioners and policy makers. 
DISCUSSION AND DEBATE
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Résumé
En avril 2004, le Royaume-Uni a introduit un nouveau contrat de services médicaux 
généraux (General Medical Services, ou GMS) qui prévoyait de nouvelles disposi-
tions en ce qui a trait à la gouvernance et aux mesures incitatives pour les généralistes. 
En particulier, le nouveau cadre de contrôle de la qualité et des effets (Quality and 
Outcomes Framework) est un système de points qui établit des cibles pour des normes 
cliniques, organisationnelles et de pratique et prévoit des encouragements financiers 
pour l’atteinte des niveaux de rendement établis. Ce document décrit les disposi-
tions du nouveau contrat et leur incidence sur la pratique générale – en particulier 
en Angleterre, où des changements de politique plus vastes ont également une inci-
dence importante sur les pratiques – et en dégage des leçons potentielles susceptibles 
d’intéresser les praticiens et les décideurs canadiens
T
RECENT POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL Health Service (NHS) of the United Kingdom have created shifting con-texts for the delivery of primary healthcare. In England, most attention has 
been paid to  market reforms, which incorporate patient choice, Choose and Book (a 
patient-driven electronic booking system), payment by results, Foundation Trust sta-
tus, creation of a provider market and practice-based commissioning and purchasing 
(PbC) – although the supply-side reforms in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
provide useful comparative context within the UK. However, it is the introduction of 
the new General Medical Services (GMS) contract that has had the greatest impact 
on general practice and continues to have the greatest potential for change, especially 
when combined with other changes in the English NHS, such as the Information 
Management and Technology (IM&T) Strategy. The new contract offers a unique 
experiment in the use of incentives to reward quality through the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF), which provides financial rewards to general practices 
based on a points system of over 150 quality indicators covering clinical, organization-
al and patient-focused aspects of practice (Smith and York 2004).
This paper focuses on the impact of the new GMS contract within the chang-
ing organizational and policy context of the English NHS. It begins by outlining the 
current policy context for the English NHS before moving on to describe the new 
contract and current contractual arrangements for general practice. The next section 
discusses the potential impacts on general practice in the UK. The paper ends by con-
sidering whether there are lessons for the Canadian healthcare system and the devel-
opment of primary care.
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The Policy Context
The aims of the current range of NHS reforms in England are threefold. The first is 
to stimulate a self-sustaining set of incentives that foster continuous organizational 
reform, including practice-based commissioning, patient choice and payment by results 
(a national tariff activity-based payment system). The second aim is to allow greater 
autonomy at a local level, but on a selective basis. The default approach appears to be 
the status quo ante (i.e., hierarchical control) rather than a blanket policy of decentrali-
zation; hence, some organizations will be “granted” decentralized powers (“freedoms”). 
The selective decentralization is also conditional in the sense that decentralization will 
be afforded only to those organizations whose performance (as measured by govern-
ment measures) is rated highly, such as granting Foundation Trust status to NHS 
hospitals that are rated as performing well.1 The third aim is to create a pluralistic 
model of local provision within the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. The pur-
chaser–provider distinction (first created in the 1990s quasi-market) is being extended 
to allow new market entrants, and patient choice policy requires patients to be given 
a choice of four to five providers at the point of referral by the general practitioner 
(GP), one of whom has to be a private or independent organization – a process built 
into the new Choose and Book software used to arrange referrals (DoH 2004, 2005a, 
2006). These organizational developments in commissioning and service use provide 
a rapidly evolving context for general practice within which changes to the GP con-
tract need to be analyzed, especially as the contract is UK-wide and there are different 
policy and organizational contexts in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
(Exworthy 1998; Greer 2004, 2005).
Changes in primary care also need to be set within the wider health and social 
care context in the UK. There is growing recognition of the need to support self-care 
and informal care (DoH 2006; Kerr 2005), with a concomitant recognition that long-
term and chronic health problems are not satisfactorily addressed within the NHS 
(Coulter 2006). In England, recent White Papers have stressed the importance of 
self-care and the role of the NHS in supporting it, the need to build people’s skills 
for preventing ill health and the need to support people with long-term conditions 
to manage independently (DoH 2004, 2005b, 2006). People with chronic disease 
are more likely to be users of the health system, accounting for some 80% of all GP 
consultations, while as much as 40% of general practice consultations are for minor 
ailments that could be taken care of by patients themselves (DoH 2005c; Wilson et al. 
2005). While there is widespread public support for self-care, recent surveys suggest 
that despite a well established structure for managing individual care through general 
practice, the primary healthcare team and Primary Care Trust (PCT)2 coordination, 
the NHS is poor at providing support for self-care (Coulter 2006; DoH 2004, 2005d; 
Ellins and Coulter 2005; Wilson et al. 2005). 
General practices are also being encouraged to do more public health activity 
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through a system of changes in the contract and the introduction of financial incen-
tives. The need to develop a stronger public health approach in primary care has long 
been recognized, but despite changes to GP contracts in 1990 and making public 
health a key objective of primary care organizations from the mid-1990s, develop-
ments have been limited (Peckham and Exworthy 2003; Peckham 2003). The most 
recent annual report on the NHS by the Healthcare Commission (2006) has high-
lighted the lack of investment in, and priority given to, public health.
General practice in the UK also faces a number of other challenges resulting from 
changes in the workforce, and greater pressure to apply evidence-based medicine and 
treatment protocols and meet centrally set targets – a complex context into which the 
new contract has been introduced. In addition, access to primary care in the UK has 
fundamentally changed in recent years with the introduction of NHS Direct (a 24-
hour telephone/Internet advice service), walk-in centres, increased private provision 
of general practice, complementary and alternative medicine, and physiotherapy and 
counselling services (Peckham 2004, 2006). These challenges are not unrecognized by 
the profession, and the need for general practice to respond to social change was the 
topic of a Royal College of General Practitioners working group on the future of gen-
eral practice (Wilson et al. 2006).
The New GMS Contract
In 2004, the new General Medical Services contract was introduced in the UK. The 
contract marked a major change in the way GPs are contracted with the NHS. Under 
the old system, GP principals held an individual contract that, despite changes in sub-
stance, remained based on the original contract established in 1948. GP incomes were 
made up from a mixture of funding for registered patients (capitation), undertaking 
specific activities and support for practice development, such as nursing and admin-
istration staff (Moon and North 2000). The new GMS contract has been developed 
from pilots of new contractual forms introduced in the late 1990s under Primary 
Medical Services designed to stimulate innovation in practice (Riley et al. 2003; 
Meads et al. 2003). 
The main principles of the new contract are:
• a shift from individual-GP to practice-based contracts
• contracts based on workload management, with core and enhanced service levels
• a reward structure based on the new Quality and Outcomes Framework and 
annual assessments
• an expansion of primary care services
• modernization of practice infrastructure (especially IT systems).
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Aspects of the new contractual arrangements for general practice that are less dis-
cussed are the Personal Medical Services (PMS), Alternative Provider Medical 
Services (APMS) and Specialist Provider Medical Services (SPMS) contracts. PMS 
originated in 1996 to encourage innovation in structure and services in general prac-
tice, and about one-third of practices held a PMS contract in 2005. While there has 
been some innovation – with greater emphasis placed on multi-professional models 
with less GP involvement – PMS have not as yet significantly challenged the domi-
nant general practice model of a small team of GPs supported by other staff. The 
introduction of salaried GPs and of nurse practitioners were identified as key new 
approaches. Yet, there has been little encroachment on the organization of practices, 
and nurse-led practices and nurse practitioners remain scarce – only nine nurse-
led practices have been developed, and growth in the numbers of salaried GPs in 
non-PMS and PMS practices is similar (Sibbald et al. 2000). Structural barriers to 
non–GP provided practice remain engrained in professional guidelines and statu-
tory responsibilities for prescribing and patient care (Houghton 2002). Importantly, 
the experience of PMS paved the way for the introduction of the new GMS contract 
(Smith et al. 2005). 
Contracts under APMS and SPMS are much rarer, and while the opportunity to 
develop new forms of primary care practice exists, few contracts have been let. These 
variations on the GMS contract were introduced by the government to encourage 
NHS commissioners to explore alternative organizational models of primary care, 
particularly from the independent and private sectors, but local hostility has limited 
success. In Derbyshire, an APMS contract was let to United Healthcare, but local 
residents have forced a judicial review of the PCT’s decision. The process has now 
resumed, but with three local residents sitting as patient/public representatives on the 
commissioning panels. Medical professional groups remain generally hostile to the 
encroachment of large private companies in general practice. SPMS contracts have also 
been used to develop local primary care services, but again, on a limited scale. To date, 
such contracts have been used to develop specialist private services (nurses and thera-
pists working in the community in Surrey are proposing to use SPMS to establish a 
limited company) or to establish new formal relationships in virtual organizations to 
deliver care in well-defined circumstances (e.g., integrated care services in Epsom and 
North Bradford, and drug abuse and long-term care services) (CSIP 2006).
Quality and Outcomes Framework
While there are a number of controversial aspects to the new contract, the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) has generated most debate and discussion. The 
QOF provides financial incentives for general practices to meet a range of clinical, 
organizational and patient experience criteria. It is a voluntary system that practices 
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opt into and is worth approximately £125,000 per annum for a practice if maximum 
points are achieved. Practices accumulate points for reaching set targets and then 
receive income for each point achieved (Smith and York 2004). In 2004/05, the first 
year of operation, 222 practices (2.6%) achieved the maximum number of points 
(1,050), with the average score being 958.7 points, although nearly half of all practices 
in England (4,243) achieved a score between 1,000 and 1,050. The QOF underwent 
changes into the second year to expand the range of clinical areas and place more 
emphasis on health promotion activities. The outcome for 2005/06 showed that 
practices had improved their performance across the areas identified in the QOF (see 
the Framework website at http://www.ic.nhs.uk/services/qof ), but little research has 
examined the impact of the use of such incentives on the overall process of patient care 
in general practice – particularly the extent to which the use of financial targets alter 
local practice. Similar improvements in achieving standards occurred in Wales and 
Scotland, suggesting that despite differing institutional frameworks and policy envi-
ronments, general practice has responded to QOF incentives in a similar way across 
the UK. Discussions are currently underway between the British Medical Association 
(negotiating on behalf of GPs) and the Department of Health on focusing the QOF 
more on self-care support and interventions to reduce demand in primary care.
Two aspects of the QOF are of interest. The first is the use of financial targets to 
change behaviour and the second, the impact of target systems on practice. While the 
Framework is still fairly new, there is some indication that both these factors are likely 
to be of increasing importance in the development of primary care services. Marshall 
and Harrison (2005) have suggested that use of targets and financial incentives may 
have unintended consequences on practitioner behaviour such as goal displacement 
and rule following, leading to the “crowding out” of and reduction in focus on non-
incentivized tasks. Thus, areas of clinical activity not included within the QOF may 
become seen as less important. Studies have also found that financial reward is not 
necessarily the main incentive for practitioners to engage in quality improvement 
(Spooner et al. 2001), and while targets clearly deliver changes in behaviour, they may 
lead to goal misplacement, in which rule following becomes the means to the end 
(Harrison and Smith 2004). In terms of impact on practice, the fact that practices 
have universally opted in to the QOF demonstrates that financial payments are a key 
incentive to adopt new processes. However, embedding the QOF in practices has 
implications for both organizational and clinical processes, as discussed later in this 
paper. At a minimum, participation in the QOF is dependent on adequate IT systems 
and the ability of practices to run the relevant software to collect data.
IM&T in General Practice
The development and introduction of IT systems to “manage” QOF data has been 
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central to new approaches to patient management in general practice. Practitioners 
must ensure they record data on visits so that these can be used to demonstrate that 
QOF targets are being achieved and that data can be collected to produce QOF 
returns at the end of the year. Practitioner prompt/reminder programs are widely 
used to ensure that patients have had a variety of tests and screening at each visit. The 
impetus of national programs has sharply increased IT usage in practices. The com-
bination of the national IM&T Strategy, the recording framework for the QOF and 
the Choose and Book system in England (part of the patient choice program giving 
patients the potential to book appointments directly) has pushed computer usage and 
IT more centrally into local general practices. There has been a mix of one-off financial 
incentives for practices to develop their IT infrastructures through additional contract 
payments (DES), primary care organization (PCO) investment in network IT systems 
and payment for adoption of IT systems in connection with the QOF. The aim has 
been to provide a common operating system so that practices can still opt for different 
suppliers and IT platforms but with a requirement to be able to run a minimum level 
of data systems, such as the QOF or the Choose and Book referral system in England.
Computers are now a key component of UK general practice. Over 90% of prac-
tices used computers for clinical care in 2004, and this percentage has now increased 
to virtually 100% through the QOF. However, the range of use varies among practices 
(DoH 2002), and there are important questions about the clinical safety of extensive 
reliance on IT systems (Fernando et al. 2004). The national Information Management 
and Technology Strategy is also driving forward changes in IT use in primary care, 
although there have been recent concerns about both technical and ethical aspects of 
this program in relation to the ability to achieve full linkage among practice, PCT, 
hospital and (eventually) social care IT systems and establishing a national electronic 
patient record (Cross 2006a,b). What appears to be clear, however, is that a mix of 
national policy drivers, together with incentive frameworks such as the QOF, directed 
financial support and local implementation of IT strategy through PCOs, has suc-
cessfully supported IT developments in UK general practice, providing the basis for 
a number of developments and enhancements to information handling. Whether the 
government’s ultimate aims of seamless transfer of information among professionals 
and agencies across the health and social care sectors will be successful is still unclear. 
Patient information systems that would support the Choose and Book referral sys-
tem were delivered late, and the system for recording childhood immunizations failed 
to provide proper records for practices (Cross 2006a,b). In England, developed IT 
systems will be essential as robust, practice-based commissioning (PbC) is extended. 
Accuracy, and systems that work alongside each other, will be needed to deliver infor-
mation support for practices and PCTs alike.
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Implications for Practice
What impact will these changes in the GMS contract, and the introduction of PbC, 
have when combined with the wider reforms within the English NHS? Wilson et al. 
(2006) have suggested that there are four broad areas upon which the performance of 
primary care, and general practice specifically, should be measured. These are equity, 
quality of clinical care, responsiveness to patients and efficiency. UK general practice 
scores high on these criteria, but concerns about lack of support for self-care (DoH 
2005c,d), poor support for people with long-term conditions (Coulter 2006) and the 
fact that inequalities in health at a primary care level persist (Wilson et al. 2006) raise 
questions about whether general practice will retain this strong position.
Equity
To date, general practice in the UK has scored very highly in comparisons of equity 
of access (Blendon et al. 2002), although the inequity in the distribution of GPs con-
tinues to worsen, with fewer GPs per registered population in more deprived areas 
(Hann and Gravelle 2004). Research on financial incentives for public health found 
that financial reward for practices bore no relation to local need; recent research in 
Scotland found that there are small inequalities between practices in service provision 
for simple monitoring interventions, but larger inequalities for diagnostic, outcome 
and treatment measures (Langham et al. 1995; McClean et al. 2006). In addition, the 
QOF may skew practices to completing labour-intensive interventions (such as screen-
ing and treatment for hypertension) rather than interventions with greater potential 
for health gain (such as prescribing angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors 
in heart failure) because the former receive higher financial reward (Fleetcroft and 
Cookson 2006). Early analysis of the QOF also suggests a correlation between excep-
tion reporting (the exclusion of patients from reported figures for such reasons as 
patients’ refusal to attend interviews, patient frailty, lack of service) and social depriva-
tion indices (Sigfrid et al. 2006; Galvin 2006). 
Quality of care
While progress on improving clinical care in general practice has been substantial, 
there are still gaps, with wide variation in the quality of care for different patients 
(Seddon et al. 2001). Major successes have occurred in areas where targets have 
been set or additional resources have been provided (Campbell et al. 2003, 2005). 
Therefore, the QOF process should lead to improvements in clinical care as it pro-
vides targets associated with additional funding. There is emerging evidence, though, 
that the QOF is changing relationships in practices, with responses directed primarily 
towards the technical problem of designing information systems to rationalize practice 
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and collect relevant data rather than addressing clinical issues for guiding  practice 
(Checkland 2006). What impact this response will have on the quality of care is not 
clear at present, but it challenges the concept of individualized care. In addition, the 
numbers of practitioners dealing with the care of individual patients because of the 
need to meet 24/48-hour targets,3 and the increasing range of people involved, raise 
questions about continuity of care and clinical quality. 
Responsiveness to patients
UK general practice enjoys a high level of patient satisfaction, although patients 
express dissatisfaction about their levels of involvement in decisions about their 
care (Healthcare Commission 2005; Wilson et al. 2006). High satisfaction may be 
influenced by more general factors such as location, relatively easy access, longer con-
sultation times and improved use of the wider primary healthcare team (Wilson et 
al. 2006). Responsiveness also includes the appropriate application of resources in 
accordance with need. [NB I HAVE BROKEN THIS PARAGRAPH—ED.]
Efficiency
International comparison demonstrates that the NHS system has reduced health 
costs in the UK and that the wide access to general practice services reduces demand 
for specialist hospital care (Starfield 1998; Roberts and May 1998). Data from the 
QOF have identified that practices are undertaking more activity; whether this is 
actual or better measured is perhaps open to debate, and there are concerns about the 
impact of the QOF on equity. The introduction of PbC may help to drive further cost 
efficiencies in patient care, although the evidence to support significant cost savings in 
previous primary care–led purchasing has been equivocal (Smith et al. 2005). How far 
PCTs can maintain a coordinated approach across practices to reduce inequities and 
allocative inefficiencies remains to be seen – particularly as patient choice will increase 
uncertainty in local healthcare systems. 
Other implications
The increasing emphasis on self-care and public health should mean that general 
practice, as the most local and universally accessed part of the NHS, plays a key role 
in these areas. The development of QOF criteria focusing on public health measures 
and clinical care for people with long-term conditions such as coronary heart disease 
and diabetes represents a shift towards trying to provide incentives for specific activi-
ties. However, the steep increase in GP earnings and questions about actual increases 
in activity have been highlighted in the media, and there has also been criticism from 
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within the nursing profession that while pay rises were meant to reward additional 
work in the practice, the main group of staff undertaking these wider health promo-
tion and patient support roles are in fact nurses, not GPs (Amicus/CPHVA 2006). 
The contract raises important questions about the internal relationships within prac-
tices and the appropriate staff mix to provide the required services, and also whether 
processes (e.g., for meeting QOF targets) have become more important drivers in 
general practice than clinical expertise. Early evidence suggests that while there is 
potential in these contract mechanisms to change practice behaviour and work proc-
ess, the current direction would seem to be one that creates more techno-bureaucratic 
approaches to patient care. PCTs and other healthcare purchasers have not yet made 
sufficientl use of the flexibilities that the contract provides to explore new models of 
primary care, and the focus on private provision may be unhelpful, as it has led to 
conflict. In fact, most private primary care provision has been developed by GPs and 
employs traditional models of general practice that, on the face of emerging evidence, 
have not been particularly successful at addressing either the long-term care needs of 
patients or key public health problems in local communities (Coulter 2006; Kai and 
Drinkwater 2003).
Finally, tensions are evolving in the system among competing demands and targets. 
Patient choice and the Choose and Book system focus attention on responsiveness to 
choices about location of secondary care. However, recent concerns about funding and 
the need for PCTs as strategic purchasers to manage demand have led to the increased 
use of central referral centres as intermediaries between the GP and the provider. In 
addition, there have been concerns about the NHS’s IM&T systems, and uptake of 
Choose and Book has been slow, with many GPs still not using the system (Cross 
2006b; Pothier et al. 2006).
Conclusion
So, what can Canadian primary care and family practice learn from recent UK and, 
more specifically, English experience? There are clear organizational similarities. 
Regionalization and local integration of funding in many Canadian provinces (such 
as the development of LHINs in Ontario) certainly mirror the development of PCTs 
(England), Local Health Boards (Wales) and Local Health and Social Care Groups 
(Scotland). However, a key difference is that funding for family practice in Canada 
remains separate from other healthcare funding, whereas in the UK, general practice 
funding has been more closely aligned with other funding streams – for example, 
the general practice contracts now held by PCTs. There are a number of tensions in 
current policy that may be particularly relevant to Canada. A central tension is that 
between measures seeking to integrate and control general practice through centrally 
defined performance targets, adherence to policy goals, increased managerial involve-
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ment (such as managing referrals (Davies and Elwyn 2006) and regulation of profes-
sional practice on the one hand, and pressures for diversity and fragmentation through 
the development of different contract models, new providers, patient choice and the 
redesign of general practice on the other.
Despite differences between the two health systems, the mechanisms being devel-
oped to measure quality and reward practices are clearly transferable, and the new 
GMS contract has generated a lot of international interest. As suggested here, the 
use of the financial incentives in the QOF to change practice does work and is lead-
ing to improvements in clinical care across the UK. The more difficult assessment is 
whether these incentives produce the right improvements or, in fact, the best-value 
improvements. The QOF may actually discriminate against deprived area practices. 
Smaller practices in deprived areas do less well in the QOF than larger practices in 
affluent areas, reducing their ability to develop the kinds of organizational systems 
needed to tackle the problems associated with deprivation and achieve greater success 
in meeting QOF targets (Wang et al. 2006). Two points that are highly relevant in 
the Canadian context are the need for good organizational structures and processes in 
family practice for a QOF system to operate (and for practices to improve the most), 
and concerns about the skewing of payments towards more affluent areas away from 
more deprived areas, creating further disincentives for practitioners to provide services 
to socially disadvantaged populations. 
The development of PbC and extension of private providers is uniquely English 
(rather than UK), building on previous approaches to primary care–led commission-
ing and purchasing. How replicable this approach would be in Canada remains uncer-
tain, as with fundholding in the 1990s (Peckham 1997). The UK experience suggests 
that the most successful PbCs will be small and focused, but many of the models 
being developed are locality based. It is still too early to tell how PbC will develop 
– especially in the absence of real incentives to support its development compared 
to development of the early fundholders. As for private provision, here there may be 
more similarities with Canada, given the independent nature of general and family 
practice in both countries. Yet, the dominant private model in the UK is similar to the 
traditional GP model and really builds on the position of the GP as an independent 
practitioner. The new contract structures and emphasis on self-care and public health 
are key elements of policy, but the GP model remains central in these developments. 
While local funders (such as PCTs) have the potential to develop new, innovative 
models of care using new contractual structures, to date little has been done to achieve 
these. How far private and not-for-profit providers are willing to enter such a market 
remains to be seen. The present model consists mainly of companies run by GPs, 
offering services similar to traditional general practice, which may expain why these 
private providers have not been challenged by local professional committees. 
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Fortunately, the health system in Canada is not under the same pressure of rapid 
reform, nor has it experienced the continuous raft of policy change to which the NHS 
has been subjected. For Canadian observers, the devolved UK NHS provides a unique 
policy laboratory, with four system models emerging but sharing the common features 
of the GMS contract and the QOF. In this sense, perhaps, Canadian policy makers 
should watch and learn. 
Correspondence may be addressed to: Stephen Peckham, Senior Lecturer in Health Service 
Delivery and Organisation, Department of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical medicine, Keppel Street, London  WC1E 7HT. Email: Stephen.Peckham@lshtm.
ac.uk
NOTES
1. The star rating system is operated by the Healthcare Commission and rates all NHS organiza-
tions as 0–3 star performers based on a basket of performance indicators.
2. Primary Care Trusts are the main commissioners of healthcare services in England and hold 
over 75% of the NHS budget for primary and secondary care. General practice contracts are held 
between practices and PCTs. Following reorganization in October 2006, there are now 150 PCTs 
(reduced from 302) in England, varying in size from populations of 136,000 to 1.2 million.
3. Patients are guaranteed access to a primary care practitioner within 24 hours or a general practi-
tioner within 48 hours. This does not have to be the patient’s own GP.
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